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Introduction 
As the world economy is slowly recovering from the financial crisis countless analyses have 
been drafted about the how and why of this crisis. By now, the terms, systemic risks, systemic 
failure and complex financial products seem able to convey the deeper causes of the financial 
crisis to most of us. Basically, many critics have analyzed how in the financial market, risks 
were externalized and remodeled into new financial products to the extent that nobody knew 
what risks they were running. The sheer complexity of the financial instruments that were 
created meant that no single actor was able to assess the true risk to which they were exposed. 
Furthermore, the aggregate problem was that nobody knew that the financial system as a 
whole was exposed as a result of this problem. The financial system had not been designed 
nor envisaged to have to cope with the conditions that occurred during the financial crisis. As 
such, the financial shocks and turmoil that hit the financial markets may be regarded as a 
highly complex, unpredictable and improbable phenomenon. The problems of late seem a 
grim reminder of the inherent unpredictability of the economy. 
What is disturbing is that increasingly, more and more of these low probability/high-impact 
events seem to occur in a variety of sectors and industries. These events have been nick-
named „Black swans‟ (Taleb, 2007). “In the field of energy provision, public transport, health, 
financial services and large-scale infrastructure there have been major public crises” and 
governments have become aware of “big system and project failures, and the vulnerabilities 
they create” (Power, 2004:11). These crises were the result of systemic failures. As 
governments play an important role in the safeguarding of society against systemic risks, an 
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important question is whether governments are capable of adequately identifying and dealing 
with these „black swans‟ and unexpected events and whether governments are adequately 
managing these systemic risks.  
  
On a smaller scale, similar problems to occur in the world of infrastructures. With 
infrastructures, we mean a set of large-scale technical systems that provide essential services 
such as the water, electricity and transportation systems as well as the internet. Either, during 
their construction (e.g. Amsterdam and Cologne subway construction failures, 2008/2009; the 
financing of infrastructure projects, cf. Priemus et al., 2008; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; (Ng and 
Loosemore, 2007)) or during the operational phase (e.g. California electricity crisis, 
2000/2001; cf. De Bruijne, 2006; 2009; problems in other electricity markets, cf. Woo et al., 
2003; incidents in the English Railway industry, cf. Cullen 2001a; 2001b) unexpected events 
seem to defeat the risk management methods that guide the projects and operations in these 
infrastructures (cf. Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). In response to incidents of this nature, public 
organizations have oftentimes been required to move in and assume (financial) 
responsibilities to prevent further damages. Problems in a range of western countries and a 
variety of infrastructures raise suspicions that we are dealing with systemic problems and not 
isolated incidents. This makes the analogy with the financial crisis an interesting point of 
departure.  
Governments increasingly seem unable to adequately assess and predict the risks that modern 
day society is exposed to. A lot of the risks that are inherently present in large scale 
infrastructure projects remain unobserved or unknown until they „occur‟. It seems as though 
governments in today‟s world are confronted with more risks, than they are able to cope 
with.
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 But what does this mean for the management of risks. Are governments unable to 
adequately manage risks in infrastructure industries? What valuable lessons can be learned 
from the financial crisis? What can we learn about the financial crisis for the management of 
large scale projects? And more specifically for the management of risk?  
In this paper we will focus specifically on large infrastructure construction projects. One of 
the reasons to tackle these projects in particular is that the size of failure costs for these 
particular projects is particularly high (cf. Van Staveren, 2006:16-17). 
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 However, “the evidence that the world is more risky or dangerous is at best equivocal” (Powers, 2004:38). 
 3 
On the crisis of ‘traditional’ risk management 
One of the key questions is how governments and public institutions currently seek to manage 
risks in large public infrastructure projects. Obviously, „traditional‟ risk management tools are 
proposed as the instruments to identify potential hazards by identifying their probability of 
occurrence and the magnitude of the impact (cf. Williams, 1995). 
 
However, current risk management systems seem unable to fully incorporate all the 
complexities and uncertainties that characterize modern day social systems and the 
management methods that are used to control those potential risks. A number of 
characteristics may identify why this is the case.
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 First of all, risk management is the management of expectations and (only) deals with the 
analysis of hazards that can be identified and „foreseen‟. The risk management tools are 
very well able to identify risks that are known. For some projects and types of risks, this is 
simply not the case (cf. Atkinson et al., 2006). There remain so-called unknown unknowns 
(cf. Longstaff, 2005). Unforeseen risks are those that are not taken into account during the 
risk management process and “are typically located outside the circle of influence of all 
project stakeholders” (Van Staveren, 2006:36). Examples of well-known risks in large-
scale public infrastructure projects include long-established infrastructure designs (i.e. 
proven technology), which logically contrast to more innovative and radical designs that 
create uncertainties (i.e. “the absence of information about parts of a system under 
consideration” (Van Staveren, 2006:26)). 
 Secondly, even by looking at risks, past events may be insufficient predictors of the 
future. According to Taleb (2007), the relatively small amount of knowledge that we have 
that would predict low probability/high impact events is often insufficient too. Our 
knowledge from the past therefore seems to provide little comfort to plan for the future. 
This is especially treacherous as the majority of large-infrastructure projects of contain 
elements of innovative design and management. Most infrastructure projects are unique, 
and especially in the construction of large-scale projects, unique constellations of actors 
emerge to work on these projects. The interaction effects between new elements in 
designs and proven technologies or procedures are a case in point and redefine the risks 
that are present (cf. Petroski, 1992). 
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 Here a number of these issues are identified, but the list is not meant to be exhaustive. 
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 Thirdly, “risk management is much more than a technical analytical practice; it also 
embodies significant values and ideals, not least of accountability and responsibility” 
(Powers, 2004:11)(Kutsch and Hall, 2010). A fundamental assumption underlying risk 
management is that information about risks is present and that risks can be attributed to 
specific actors. Especially in large-scale infrastructure projects, experiences have taught 
us to recognize the complexity of large-scale infrastructure projects and the institutional 
fragmentation of the construction industry which has resulted in a nested and layered 
structure in which contractors, subcontractors and free-lance specialists „partner up‟ 
together to design, build  (and/or exploit) infrastructures. Large-scale infrastructure 
projects are often composed of public-private consortia‟s in which numerous parties play 
an important role with regard to risks. The planning and construction of large scale 
infrastructure projects have evolved into complex projects with large numbers of actors 
involved. In large infrastructure projects risks are spread out among the number of actors 
involved in the project, which blurs the image. The knowledge of the project and its 
characteristics becomes fragmented across a large number of actors that are unable to 
identify all the (potential) interdependencies and risks that are involved in the changing of 
a single (sub)parameter in the infrastructure design phase. Unclear is who bears what 
responsibility with regard to specific risks. In fact according to critics, complex risk 
management problems become “processes of consent management in the face of the 
unknowable” (Power, 2004:55). Nowadays, construction projects are public-private 
consortia‟s in which numerous parties play an important role. Van Staveren (200:12) 
claims that in the design and construction of Terminal 2E of the Roissy-Charles de Gaulle 
Airport in Paris over 400 different construction and engineering parties from across 
Europe were involved.  
 Construction value chains have also increased in length as new technologies and new 
innovations were incorporated in large-scale infrastructures. Along with the increased 
interdependence that was just explained, we could also argue that exactly this 
interdependence not only increases the possibilities for more well-known risks to occur, 
but also increases the subjective assessment of others in the entire process. Here the 
problems of rationality and the risk handling of risk takers plays a role. As a consequence 
of strategic behavior, risks and insecurities are shifted and externalized, the relative scope 
and impact of these risks and insecurities raises even further.  
 The previous consideration is strengthened by the fact that risks are (highly) dynamic, 
meaning that risks and interdependencies shift as contextual situations in which large-
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scale infrastructure projects are constructed change. Increasingly, new priorities are set in 
projects as a result of the increased complexity of society (Powers, 2004:38). Between the 
risk analysis performed during the project reconnaissance phase and the project-
realization phase many things can change. However, many infrastructure projects are 
based on the assumption that there is a large technological risk component and that 
contextual factors have little influence on the project.  Instead of more traditional and 
quantifiable risks that are involved with the technical aspects of the project design, we can 
identify an increasingly larger set off dynamic risks and uncertainties emerging in these 
contextual environments. More dynamic and complex and interactive risks and less 
quantifiable uncertainties resulting from, for example more complex contracting 
arrangements (such head contractors, sub-contractors, public-private contracts) have 
increased.  
 The time and opportunity to perform an in-depth analysis to analyze risks and safety 
boundaries through classical risk management procedures have been reduced as well. The 
political environment in which large infrastructure projects are embedded has increased 
the speed with which infrastructure project management decisions have to be taken. 
Instead of taking time to explore these risks and uncertainties, these risks remain 
uncovered and are „traded off‟ for speed as management decisions are more determined by 
management targets (such as within time) than probability-estimates (Williams, 1995:25). 
Risks are distributed, and re-emerge in this phase at the start of these projects. During this 
vital contracting phase, where the outline for the conduct of the project is laid down, these 
risks become increasingly invisible. 
 One of the most fundamental problems nowadays is that many parties involved in the 
supply chain of large scale construction projects have a very low acceptance level of risk. 
This means that some actors are unwilling to absorb risks, whereas others are willing to 
take on excessive risks, resulting in fundamentally unbalanced distribution of risk. The 
end result is often such that actors no longer are aware of the risks they are taking, or are 
forced to take on risks they should never have taken on, creating more vulnerable, rather 
than more robust systems. Furthermore, large-scale projects are often only made possible 
after a long and intensive phase in which risks and rewards are traded-off against each 
other in complex and carefully balanced proposals where risks and costs are painstakingly 
distributed. Any alterations may lead to a severe crisis in the management of this type of 
project.  
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 Finally, another shift in the make-up of actors in large-scale infrastructure projects may be 
noticed. As a result of the increased institutional fragmentation, reduced oversight and 
deregulation the relative power balance that existed between actors that argue for large 
and daring infrastructure projects and those that might oppose them has shifted. This 
means that the ratio of risk-averse actors (e.g. local inhabitants, oversight bodies, public 
opinion) versus that of risk seeking actors (e.g politicans, that want to realize the projects, 
project lobbyists that want to realize the projects, consultants who have no responsibility 
to the project whatsoever, and infrastructure constructors that are looking for work) has 
shifted as well. 
 
In the list, a number of common denominators can be identified - dimensions underlying these 
observations. Instead of the „traditional‟ approach towards risks in large scale infrastructure 
projects in which specific risks are singled out, a more holistic and systemic approach is 
needed that not only deals with identified and generally accepted risks, but also identifies and 
deals with more vague and ambiguous risks and uncertainties. This means that risks have to 
be perceived and shared; ambiguity is part of the problem which requires a risk 
communication and joint image building. Since fragmentation and opportunistic behaviour is 
induced by governance structures and new ways of doing things, risks evolve from a 
governance problem in large projects. Given these „trends and developments‟, it could be 
argued that new ways of dealing with risks and uncertainty in large scale infrastructure 
projects should be considered (cf. Atkinson et al., 2006, Ward and Chapman, 2003).  
 
In search of solutions 
Considering that the abovementioned list of problems is incomplete and the highly diverse 
make-up of issues on this list, it could be concluded that the complexities of the challenges 
that face modern day public infrastructure projects are daunting. (cf. Van Staveren, 2006:20). 
The consequence must be that ways in which systems have been dealing with risks needs to 
be changed.  Solutions have been suggested to overcome these problems.  
 
For example,Van Staveren (2006:20) identifies a plea to change the risk averse attitude in the 
construction industry into a more risk seeking attitude. This requires the cooperation between 
different parties and should cause a change in the behaviour of actors in the construction 
industry from risk allocation to risk sharing. To reach this level of communication, interaction 
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between actors involved in large-scale infrastructure projects is needed to enable them to 
reach a joint perception of the risks and uncertainties involved in the project. 
Projects in which actors work together in search of common risks may be able to lower the 
possibilities of unknown and perverted risks. This would result in joint risk analysis and 
comminication to reduce ambiguity; which requires process management and collaboration. 
The ideas build on ideas of partnering.  However, this attitude has proven far more difficult to 
introduce and realized than expected. The caveat is that these types of collaborative projects 
do not succeed in an anonymous environment (where actors will strive to achieve their own 
goals rationally) but need to be embedded within a more transparent environment. This 
requires a new way of thinking and a new way of organizing large scale infrastructure 
projects. Overcoming opportunistic behavior, due to fragmentation in contracting and other 
governance issues dominate this line of thinking. 
Governance attitudes towards risk taking are reconsidered in light of the behaviour that is 
displayed in large scale infrastructure construction projects. Use of the precautionary 
principle, strict regulation and the application of larger margins and buffers stimulates actors 
to take a risk averse approach, individually assess risks and uncertainties and externalize risks 
to the largest possible extent which suffocates innovation and quality, neglects compensation 
behavior and eventually reduces chances for large projects to be realized at all.  
Another string of solutions focuses on existing risk management tools and focuses on an 
improved implementation of risk management tools: increased awareness among actors in 
large infrastructure construction projects being one of the most important issues (cf. Van 
Staveren, 2006). However, the approach becomes increasingly problematic in large-scale 
multi-actor environments and assumes a „rational‟ and top-down approach towards the way in 
which risks and uncertainties can be identified and dealt with.  
As part of a broader strategy of dealing with risks and uncertainties, some have claimed a shift 
from a predict and control towards a more realistic prepare and commit approach to risks and 
uncertainties. In allowing for broader overview of potential project uncertainties, possibilities 
for constructors, operators and users to deal with unexpected events and „black swans‟ should 
be possible. The ideas build on ideas of a learning organization, High-Reliability theory etc. 
However, in doing so, much focus and efficiency is lost.   
Again others have identified the need of a system approach in which experts with substantive 
expertise and knowledge (not managers) clarify the safety boundaries of the system 
(substantive systems versus managerial approach).  
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Finally, there are those that have forwarded the contingent approach, claiming that the form of 
regulation needed to enable and force actors in large-scale construction projects to adequately 
identify, asess and respond to risks and uncertainties depends on the context: Piling up 
process approaches likethe ones suggested in an innovative infrastructure project which is not 
regulated by existing frameworks is problematic.  
 
Conclusions 
This track aims to address challenges in risk management and identify potential solutions to 
mitigate these problems. We do not have to choose amongst these ways of dealing with the 
increased complexity of large-scale infrastructure construction projects. Each of these 
solutions has its own strengths and weaknesses.We simply identify them as possible courses 
of action or senario's to deal with the crisis identified in the process of developing large-scale 
construction projects. The track will therefore explore questions like:  
 
- What are the limits of current risk management approaches in infrastructure 
management;  
- What cases and experiences can be identified in the management of infrastructures 
where the perverting effects of the current risk management stratagems occured; 
- What alternatives to current employed management stratagems exist (for example, 
does the fact that market-based risk management strategies failed in infrastructure 
management mean a reversal to more government-based risk management strategies?) 
- What transitions in approaches to the risk management of infrastructure can be 
identified. How realistic would this be? What alternatives are left?  
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